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NAMES AND NUMBERS.^
BY PROF. ERNST MACH.
A NAME is an acoustic attribute, which I add to the other sensoryattributes of a thing or complexus of things, and which I en-
grave in my memory. Even in themselves alone, names are im-
portant. Of all the attributes of a complexus of things, they are
the most invariable. They constitute thus the most convenient
representative of that complexus as an entirety, and around them
the remaining and more variable attributes cluster in memory as
around a nucleus.
But the facility with which these attributes called names permit
of being spread and communicated is more important still. Each
observer is likely to discover different attributes in a thing
;
one
person will notice this, another will notice that ; with the result
that they will not necessarily come to an understanding regarding
the thing, or for that matter even be able to come to an understand-
ing. But the name, which always remains the same, is imprinted
as a common attribute in the memories of all persons. It is like a
label that has been attached to a thing and is known to all persons.
But it is not only attached to things, it is also preserved in the
memories of men, and leaps forth at the sight of these things, of its
own accord.
The importance of names in technical fields has never been a
subject of doubt. The possibility of procuring things which are
not within our immediate reach, the producing of effects at a dis-
tance through a chain of human beings, are attributable to names.
The ethical achievements of names are perhaps even more impor-
tant still. Names particularise individuals ; they create personali-
ties. Without names there is neither glory nor disgrace, neither
defensible personal rights, nor prosecutable crime. And by the
1 Translated from the German by T. J. McCormack.
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use of written names these marvellous performances have been en-
hanced to a stupendous degree.
When two persons part company, each soon shrinks for the
other to a mere perspective point. Without names it would be
almost impossible for the one to find the other. The fact that
we know more of some men than of others, that some men mean
more to us than others, is owing to names. Without names we
should be utter strangers to one another, as are the animals.
Fanc}' for a moment how I should be obliged to mimic, carica-
ture, and portray a person that I was seeking, in order that some
small group of people, who were perfectly familiar with my meth-
ods, could assist me in my search. But if I know that the name of
the person I am seeking is Jacques Montmartre, that he lives in
France, and in addition in Paris, at No. 45 Rue St. -Pierre Fourier,
then I am always in a position to find him by means of these names,
—names which countless numbers of different individuals associate
with the same objects, although they may know these objects under
entirely different aspects and in greatly varying degree, sometimes
themselves ^>y name only. I can thoroughly appreciate the marvel-
lous achievement involved in these performances by imagining my-
self making such a search without a knowledge of names. I should
then have to travel from country to country and from city to city,
like the people in The Arabian Nights, until I found by accident
the person whom I was seeking,—which happens only in fairy tales.
I should be in the situation of the lost child who could tell no more
than that she belonged to the "mother" who " lived in the house."
A name is the product of a convention, reached unconsciously
under the favoring influence of accident, by a limited circle of peo-
ple having common interests, and gradually communicated by that
circle to wider groups.
What are numbers? Numbers are also names. Numbers would
never have originated had we possessed the capability of picturing
with absolute distinctness to ourselves the members of a set of like
objects as different. We count where we desire to make a distinc-
tion between like things ; in doing so, we assign to each of the like
things a name, a distinguishing sign. If the distinction to be made
between the things is not effected, we have "miscounted." To ac-
complish our purpose, the signs employed must be better known
and must admit more readily of distinction than the things to be
designated. Counting, accordingly, begins with the use of the fa-
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miliar objects known as fingers, the names of which have in this
manner gradually come to be the names of numbers.^ The associa-
tion of the fingers with the things is accomplished, without effort or
design, in a definite order. In this manner, numbers are quite un-
consciously transformed into ordinal symbols. ^ As a consequence
of this invariable order, and as a consequence of it alone, the last
sign associated with the things comes to represent all the previous
associations ; this last sign is the number of the things counted.
If there are not enough fingers to associate with the things,
the original series of associations is simply repeated, and the sev-
eral series of associations so obtained are then themselves supplied
with ordinal symbols, as before. Our system of numbers becomes
in this manner a system of purely ordinal signs, which can be ex-
tended at pleasure. If the objects counted be made up of like parts,
and in each of these parts there be discovered parts which again are
alike, and so on, the same principle may be employed for the enu-
meration of these parts of parts. Our system of ordinal signs, ac-
cordingly, admits of indefinite refinement. Numbers are an orderly
system of names which admit directly and readily of indefinite ex-
tension and refinement.
Where a few objects only are to be designated, and these are
readily distinguished from one another by salient attributes, proper
names as a rule are preferred ; countries, cities, friends, are not
numbered. But objects that are numerous and which constitute in
any way a system in which the properties of the individual things
forming the system constitute a gradation, are always numbered.
Thus, numbers and not names are given to the houses of a street,
and in regularly laid out cities, also to the streets themselves. De-
grees on a thermometer are numbered, and proper names are given
to the freezing and boiling points only. The advantage here, in
addition to the mnemotechnic feature of the plan, consists in the
fact that one can easily discover by the sign of the thing the posi-
tion which it occupies in the system,—an advantage not appreciated
by the inhabitants of small towns, where the houses are unnumbered
and where there are consequently no municipal co-ordinates to as-
sist a stranger in finding his way.
The operation of counting may again be applied to the num-
bers themselves ; in this manner, not only is the development of
the number-system carried to a point considerably beyond that of
1 Cantor, Mathem. Beitriige zum Culturleben der Volktr. Cantor, Geschichte der Mathetnatik.
Tylor, Primitive Culture. Tyler, Early History ofMankind.
2 Mach, Mechanics, page 486.
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its original simplicity, as by the formation of the decimal system of
writing and of performing operations with numbers, but the entire
science of arithmetic, the entire science of mathematics, takes its
being from this application. The perception, for example, that
4 + 3 = 7, arises from the application of the ordinal signs or num-
bers of the upper horizontal row of the following diagram, to the
numbers of the row which is beneath :
1234567
1234123
I conceive the truths of arithmetic to be propositions that have
been reached by experience, understanding by experience here
inner experience ; and I long ago characterised mathematics as a
system of economically ordered experiences of counting, made ready
for immediate use, and designed to replace direct counting, which
is frequently impossible, by operations previously performed, and
hence accomplishing a great savi?ig of time and trouble.^ I am
here substantially in accord with the views which Helmholtz ex-
pressed in 1887.2 This is of course not as yet a theory of mathe-
matics, but merely a programme of such a theory. The interesting
psychological questions presented here may be seen from the work
of E. Schroder^ who was the first to inquire why the fiujiiber of the
objects is independent of the order in which they are counted. As
Helmholtz remarks,'* in any succession of objects that have been
counted in a definite order any two adjacent objects may be inter-
changed, whereby ultimately any order of succession whatever of
the objects may be produced without changing the succession of
the numbers, or causing either objects or numbers to be dropped.
The non-dependence of the sum on the order of the things added
follows from this consideration. But this inquiry cannot be pursued
farther here.
Although in the first instance counting supplies the necessary
means of distinguishing objects which are in themselves difficult to
IComp. " Ueber die okonomische Natur der physikalischen Forschung," Almanack der Wie-
ner Akadeiuie, 1882, p. 167. (Engl, trans, in Pofiular Scientific Lectures. Chicago, i8g8, p. 186.)
Also, Mechanik (1883), p. 458. (Eng. trans., Chicago, 1893, page 4S6.) Also, Analyse der Eiiipfin-
dungen, 1886, p. 165. (Eng. trans., Chicago, 1897, page 178.)
2 Helmholtz, " Zahlen und Messen," in Philosophische Au/siitzc, Editard Zeller gewidiuet
Compare especially pp. 17 and 20.
?>Lehrbuch der Arithmetik und Algebra. Leipsic, 1873, p. 14. I became acquainted with
Schroder's book, which is based upon Grassmann's work, through a quotation in the aforemen-
tioned paper of Helmholtz.
^Loc. cit., pp. 30 et seq. Conf. also Kronecker, loc. cit., p. 268.
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distinguish, it is nevertheless afterwards applied to objects which,
while clearly distinguishable, are yet in some certain respect re-
garded by us as the same, and so are interchangeable in this re-
spect. The properties with respect to which objects may be con-
sidered the same differ greatly and vary almost from mere existence
at a given point of space or moment of time to absolute undistin-
guishability. We count different objects as the same only in so far
as they are the same ; dimes, dollars, shillings, sovereigns, francs,
marks, and gulden are counted, not as dimes, dollars, shillings,
etc., but as coins. Thermometers and induction coils are counted
as physical apparatus, or as items of an inventory, but not as ther-
mometers and induction coils.
Objects counted, which are alike in some particular respect,
and which may replace one another in this respect, are called units.
What is it that is counted, for example, by the number represent-
ing a temperature? In the first place it is the divisions of the scale,
the real or apparent increments of volume or of pressure of the
thermometric substance. Geometrically or dynamically regarded, the
objects here counted may be substituted for one another, indiffer-
ently ; but with reference to the thermal state these objects are
signs or indices merely of that state, and not equivalent, enumerable
parts of a universal property of the thermal state itself.
This may be made very clear by the consideration that the
number measuring a potential for example does quantitatively de-
termine a universal property of the potential. If I cause the elec-
tric potential of a charged body to sink from 51 to 50 or from 31 to
30, I am able by so doing to raise the charge of any other body
having the same capacity one degree, indifferently whether it be
from 10 to II or from 24 to 25. Different single degrees of poten-
tial may be substituted for one another.
A relation of like simplicity does not exist for scales of tempe-
rature. A thermometer is raised approximately one degree of tem-
perature when some other thermometer of the same capacity is
lowered one degree of temperature in some other part of the scale.
But this relation is not exact ; the deviations vary with the thermo-
metric substance selected for either one or both thermometers, and
with the position of the degrees in the scale ; the deviations are
furthermore individual in character, according to the substance and
to the position in the thermometric scale ; they are vanishingly
small only in the gas scale. We may say that by cooling off a gas
thermometer one degree in any part of the scale, any other body
may be made to receive always the same alteration of thermal
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State. This property might have served as a definition of equal
degrees of temperature. Yet it is worthy of remark that this prop-
erty is not shared by all bodies whatsoever that pass through the
course of temperature-changes indicated by the gas thermometer,
for the reason that their specific heat is in general dependent upon
the temperature. It is no less deserving of mention that this prin-
ciple was not intentionally embodied in the construction of the
temperature-scale, but subsequently proved itself by accident to be
substantially fulfilled. The conscious and rational introduction of
a scale of temperature having universal validity analogous to the
potential scale was first made by Sir William Thomson. The tem
perature-numbers of the common scale are virtually inventorial
numbers of the thermal states.
